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Sustainable, cost-effective pest management strategies may be key to improving the 
welfare of farmers around the world.  Plant pests and diseases damage crops and cause 
large economic losses.  Farmers often use costly pesticides to combat these plant pests 
and diseases.  Integrated Pest Management (IPM) technologies can be more effective, 
while incurring fewer health and environmental costs.  Unfortunately, it can be difficult 
to achieve widespread adoption of IPM technologies, partly because they are complex 
and often involve a number of linked practices.  For the past two decades significant 
resources have been invested into dissemination of IPM knowledge, especially via 
Farmer Field Schools (FFS) (Feder, Murgai, Quizon 2004; Godtland et al 2004).  Such 
direct training is costly, and even if an effective pest management strategy exists, many 
farmers have difficulty learning about and then implementing a new strategy (Rola, 
Jamias, Quizon 2002). 
Farmers in developing countries frequently face asymmetric information and high 
search costs.  Farmers with little knowledge about pesticides or new pest-control 
technologies are forced to rely on others for information.  Trust is a factor that determines 
whether farmers accept another person’s knowledge.  If a farmer does not trust an 
individual as a source of information then he or she will continue a search for more 
trustworthy sources.   However, search costs must be balanced against the value of trust.  
When farmers have more trust in others, the costs of search fall because the likelihood of 
finding someone who is trusted grows.  Trust may help overcome asymmetric 
information problems; it can help facilitate the diffusion of knowledge.   2
Programs to efficiently spread pest management knowledge may be enhanced by 
understanding how trust facilitates interactions between farmers and community 
members and interactions between farmers and agricultural technicians.  We refer to the 
former as horizontal trust and latter as vertical trust.  To date, no known experimental 
studies have examined differences between horizontal and vertical trust or investigated 
factors associated with differences in these two types of trust.  Furthermore, no studies 
have investigated how horizontal and vertical trust may be related to knowledge spread.  
This article examines these factors.  We begin with an examination of factors associated 
with farmer trust in community farmers, and their trust in agricultural technicians.  Then 
we investigate whether the presence of trusting ties between community farmers and 
professionals is correlated with pesticide knowledge scores 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First we develop our 
conceptual framework for building empirical models to identify correlates of trust and 
how trust may be associated with knowledge.  Next we introduce the data sources and 
briefly describe our experimental protocol.  Then we provide our econometric 
identification strategy and in the following section we share our empirical results.  We 
conclude with implications and limitations of the analysis. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Knowledge Spread and Trust 
Information is known to spread through social networks.  Coleman et al (1966) found that 
physicians who were embedded in medical communities with more interpersonal 
networks adopted new medical technology before others.  Granovetter (1975) showed   3
that information about employment opportunities spread through social networks; 
individuals embedded in dense social networks improve their chances of obtaining 
employment.  Barr (2000) finds that social networks facilitate flows of technical 
information among Ghanaian manufacturer enterprises, improving their economic 
performance. 
The idea that knowledge spreads through social networks supports the merits of 
social capital, but what about when the knowledge is bad?  For instance, public health 
workers in Sub-Saharan Africa might prefer that young women obtain their knowledge 
about HIV/AIDS and other STDs from a women’s clinic rather than from her peers or 
potential sexual partners.  Unfortunately, young women in Sub-Sahara Africa are often 
embedded in social networks dominated by peers and potential sexual partners; public 
health workers are typically absent from their social networks.  Likewise, agricultural 
professionals in Ecuador may be frustrated when rural farmers obtain faulty pesticide 
information from their neighbors or untrained chemical sales representatives rather than 
obtaining information about appropriate usage from trained agricultural technicians. 
In scenarios such as those described above, trusting ties in an individual’s social 
network may lead to very different outcomes.  Our interest is in determining how social 
capital contributes to the flow of knowledge in information networks via horizontal and 
vertical trust.  If community members have bad information about pesticides and 
agricultural technicians have good information about pesticides, then we expect that more 
trust in agricultural technicians than community members is positively associated with 
pesticide knowledge.  In addition, if trust is associated with knowledge outcomes, then it   4
would be interesting to know which characteristics are associated with horizontal and 
vertical trust as well as differences between the two, trust preference. 
To capture our trust measures we employ an economic experiment, the investment 
game, commonly called the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995).  There are 
two players, a truster (also called the sender) and trustee (also called the receptor).   The 
sender starts with a given endowment.  In the first move, the sender may send part, all or 
none of his/her endowment to an anonymous person, the receptor.  Any money the sender 
passes to the receptor is tripled; this tripled amount is given to the receptor.  The receptor 
has the opportunity to return part, none or all of the money to the sender; however, the 
receptor is under no obligation to return any part of the money.  None of these plays are 
observed by participants; in addition, the senders do not know how much money is 
returned to them by the receptors until after all plays have been made.  Since the play of 
the receptor is anonymous and the game is not repeated, we expect the receptor to return 
nothing to the sender under the assumption that individuals are self-interested.  From 
backward induction the sender identifies the receptor’s ‘return nothing’ strategy.  Hence, 
the only sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium is that the sender sends nothing because 
he/she expects the receptor to return nothing.  However, in both laboratory and field 
experiments, players rarely play according to this strategy (Barr 2003; Berg et al 1995; 
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Soutter 2000; Schechter 2006).  Senders typically send money.  
Social scientists often attribute this deviation from expected play to trust
1.  We have 
farmers play the game with other farmers as well as agricultural technicians.  Since the   5
farmers know which class of receptor with whom they are playing, we obtain measures of 
horizontal and vertical trust.  
Recently social scientists have questioned whether the action of the sender in the 
investment game is a measure of trust or just a measure of the propensity to gamble 
(Eckel and Wilson 2004; Karlan 2005; Schechter 2006).  In a laboratory setting, Eckel 
and Wilson find that experimental measures of trust are not correlated with experimental 
or survey measures of risk; however, in field experiments, both Karlan and Schechter 
present evidence that experimental trust measures are partially determined by, or at least 
associated with, risk behavior.  Given that senders may base their play according to risk 
level, we have the participants play a risk game designed by Schechter (2006), and 




We have experimental observations from 191 naranjilla farmers from two areas in the 
Ecuadorian Upper Amazon Basin.  These farmers played the trust game (Berg et al 1995) 
and a risk game (Schechter 2006).  They also completed an extensive survey on 
demographic, socioeconomic and other characteristics, and a pesticide knowledge exam.  
Data are from five sites in two adjacent counties of the Pastaza province.  In one site we 
had three experimental sessions, and at the others we had two each.  Each workshop day 
began by randomly dividing the farmers into two experimental groups (‘Group 1’ and 
‘Group 2’).  In the morning, Group 1 attended a 3 1/2 hour seminar given by an 
agricultural technician on IPM and appropriate pesticide use; Group 2 attended a 3 1/2   6
hour session where they participated in our economic experiments
3.  While they waited to 
participate in the experiments, attendees completed the survey.  In the afternoon the 
groups switched activities. 
 
Empirical Methods 
Our empirical methods consist of econometric models to (i) investigate levels of trust and 
(ii) explore how trust levels relate to pesticide knowledge levels.  We begin with a model 
including physical and human capital variables, basic demographic variables, and farm-
level and field day variables.  Then we add our experimental measures of behavioral 
norms. 
The OLS specifications of the econometric models for the trust measures are: 
H i i H i H i H H i Z Y X HTrust ,
' ' '
3 2 1 0 ε β β β β + + + + =       (1) 
V i i V i V i V V i Z Y X VTrust ,
' ' '
3 2 1 0 ε β β β β + + + + =       (2) 
D i i D i D i D D i i i Z Y X Diff HTrust VTrust ,
' ' '
3 2 1 0 ε β β β β + + + + = = −    (3) 
where HTrusti (horizontal trust) is the number of dollars passed from the i
th sender to an 
unknown community member, and VTrusti (vertical trust) is the number of dollars passed 
from the i
th sender to an unknown agricultural technician.  Xi is a vector of physical and 
human capital, and basic demographic and farm-level information; Yi is a vector of 
experimental measures of risk and reciprocity; Zi is a vector of field day characteristics. 
We examine correlates of pesticide knowledge according to physical and human 
capital, basic demographic, farm-level and field day characteristics, experimental   7
measures of risk, reciprocity and trust, and history of pesticide use.  The OLS 
specification of the econometric model for knowledge is: 
K i i K i K i K i K K i Pesticide Z Y X Knowledge ,
' ' ' ) (
4 3 2 1 0 ε β β β β β + + + + + =  (4) 
where Knowledgei is the percentage of correct answers on the knowledge exam
4.  In 
equation (4) we have Xi as before; Yi is a vector of experimental variables controlling for 
risk, reciprocity and trust; Zi, controls for Seminar; Pesticide is a dummy variable for 
whether farmers started using pesticides more than five years ago.   
As with many studies of social capital there exists the concern of reverse 
causality.  Does trust enable farmers to overcome asymmetric information and seek out 
farming advice, or do interpersonal interactions with others increase knowledge and 
farming outcomes, which then increase levels of trust?  Recent studies on social capital 
admit that identifying appropriate instrumental variables to solve the endogenous variable 
problem is difficult (Carter and Castillo 2003; Durlauf 2002; Miguel, Gertler and Levine 
2006). 
Because it is difficult to find variables that are correlated with the trust measures 
but are not correlated with knowledge, we do not use an instrumental variables approach.  
Rather we treat our regressions as investigations of correlates of trust and knowledge.  
We do not make inferences about causal relations.  However, our study design allows us 
to elicit some insight into the different ways trust may be associated with knowledge 
outcomes. 
We contend that vertical trust will only be associated with knowledge when 
farmers have had prior opportunities to interact with agricultural technicians.  Therefore,   8
in Triunfo, where there have been prior farm training workshops, vertical trust and 
knowledge should be more strongly associated than among farmers from Santa Clara, 
where no prior farm training workshops were held.  To test this hypothesis we run 
separate regressions of equation (4) according to county
5. 
In addition, we argue that farmers who attend the training seminar before taking 
the knowledge exam may also demonstrate a stronger association between vertical trust 
and knowledge scores.  Farmers who trust agricultural technicians compared to those 
who do not, ceteris paribus, have higher expected returns from paying attention during 
the seminar; hence, farmers with vertical trust pay attention and then score higher on the 
knowledge exam.  Farmers who take the knowledge exam and then attend the seminar do 
not have the same opportunity to operationalize their trust in agricultural technicians; 
vertical trust may demonstrate a weaker association with knowledge.  To examine this 





Our sample of farmers is diverse in age, education, wealth and family size, and a 
significant portion were female (28%) and attended high school (17%).  Approximately 
60% of our participants came from Santa Clara County while the rest were from Triunfo 
County.  About 60% of the farmers attended the seminar before participating in the 
experiments and completing the pesticide knowledge exam (table 2).   9
In our economic experiments we obtain similar results as those of Schechter 
(2006), who played the trust and risk game in Paraguay.  An important difference 
between these two studies is that our study has farmers play the trust game with 
agricultural technicians in addition to playing the trust game with people from their own 
community
7.  In the Paraguay study participants sent about 46% of their initial 
endowment, while in our study participants sent about 44% of their initial endowment to 
other farmers and about 46% to agricultural technicians.  In the Paraguay study, 
participants bet about 43% of their initial endowment; in our study they bet 46%.  
Schechter’s study, like ours, found that “trust did pay;” participants returned on average 
about 38% of what they were sent.  A Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test can not reject the null 
hypothesis that the median value sent to farmers in our experiment was identical to the 
median value sent to agricultural technician; however, we find that less than 30% of the 
farmers played the trust game the same with an agricultural technician as they did with a 
farmer from their community.  Moreover, an Epps-Singleton (1986) test indicates that the 
difference in distribution of money sent is significant at the 5% level (p-value 0.012), 
suggesting that farmers may not view the trust game with farmers as the same as the trust 
game with agricultural technicians. 
We also find that a Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the median value bet in the risk game is identical to the amount sent in either of the 
trust games.  However, we find that only 32% of the farmers played the risk game the 
same as they played the trust game with farmers, and only 26% played the risk game the 
same as they played the trust game with agricultural technicians.  Although the average   10
amount sent in each of the trust games and risk game are similar, less than 11% of the 
farmers played the same in all three games and over a third did not play the same in any 
of the three games.  An Epps-Singleton test for equality of distributions rejects the 
hypothesis of no difference in the distribution of play in the risk game and play of the 
trust game with farmers.  This is evidence that farmers are not treating the trust game 
with farmers and the risk game the same.  However, the same test could not reject the 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the distribution of play in the risk game and play 
of the trust game with agricultural technicians, suggesting that farmers may be framing 
the trust game with agricultural technicians and the risk game as the same.  We might 
expect play in the risk game to be predictive of play in the trust game against agricultural 
technicians; we will see this is not the case. 
 
Horizontal Trust Regression Results 
In table 4 we present our results from the regressions of trust on their correlates.  In 
column (1) we find that the only statistically significant correlates of horizontal trust are 
Male and Large Farm; none of the other variables including Age, Basic Education, 
Advanced Education, Wealth, or Household are significant.  Previous research has found 
that men trust more than women in the trust game (Chaudhuri and Gangedharan 2002; 
Eckel and Wilson 2000), although Schechter (2006) attributes difference in play to risk 
behavior.  In column (2) of table 4 we find, like Schechter, that after controlling for risk 
behavior that women and men do not trust differently.  However, after controlling for risk 
behavior we still find that participants with larger farms trust other farmers more.  During   11
the interviews many of the participants with larger farms reported hiring local farmers for 
labor.  Perhaps hiring laborers is a way to develop personalized trust with local farmers.  
These findings may also reflect power relations: larger farm owners may feel that 
neighbors respect them and return this respect with trust. 
 
Vertical Trust Regression Results 
In column (3) of table 4 we find that the only statistically significant correlates of vertical 
trust are Age, County, Argue; none of the other variables, most notably Male, is a 
significant correlate of vertical trust.  In column (4) we find that, contrary to the results 
presented in the summary statistics, risk behavior does not explain variation in play of the 
trust game against agricultural technicians; County, Argue, and Reciprocity are the only 
significant correlates of vertical trust.  It is not surprising that County is significant when 
we consider that farmers from Santa Clara report that they have never participated in 
farmer field days or workshops; farmers in Triunfo have participated in such events.  
Perhaps farmers in Triunfo have more vertical trust because of positive past experiences 
with agricultural technicians. 
In a similar vein we found the variable Argue is loosely correlated with play in the 
trust game against agricultural technicians.  An argument occurred before one game 
session; the issue was resolved and a positive trusting tie was formed between the 
participants, enumerators and game managers.  We suggest that that these farmers trusted 
agricultural technicians more because they felt they could trust those running the 
workshop.   12
Finally, our regression results suggest that a farmer’s willingness to reciprocate is 
associated with higher trust in agricultural technicians.  Perhaps the farmers who returned 
more to the senders did so out of respect for social contracts.  If they also perceive that 
professionals, such as agricultural technicians, have more incentive to respect social 
contracts then we would expect such farmers to pass more money to agricultural 
technicians; these farmers have the expectation that professionals would reciprocate. 
 
Difference in Trust (VTrust-HTrust) Regression Results 
Our regressions on Diff (table 4, columns 5 and 6) provides insight into those factors 
associated with difference in play of the trust games.  We noted earlier that women and 
men did not have different trust behaviors after controlling for risk.  However, if we 
consider individual observations we find that women are more likely to send money to 
agricultural technicians than to farmers (columns (5) and (6), table 4).  This suggests that 
gender is associated with how farmers perceive different trust relationships.  In addition, 
the results corroborate evidence from the horizontal trust regression that farm size is 
associated with trust behavior among our sample of farmers.  Evidence is also found that 
past experiences with agricultural technicians, measured per the variables County and 




   13
Knowledge Regression Results 
The variables Seminar, Pesticide, HTrust and Reciprocity are significantly related to 
Knowledge about pesticides (column (2), table 5).  Attending the seminar before taking 
the knowledge exam is associated with a 5.9% increase in the score.  Using pesticides for 
more than five years is associated with a 12.7% increase on the exam score.  One more 
dollar sent to another farmer (horizontal trust) is associated with a 2.7% decrease on the 
exam score.  A 10% increase in the amount returned to the original farmers is associated 
with a 2.5% decrease on the exam score. 
We find that the variable Diff is positively associated with knowledge scores 
(column (2), table 6); each additional dollar sent to an agricultural technician than sent to 
a farmer is associated with approximately 2% increase on the exam score.  This result 
indicates who farmers trust more and the magnitude in the differential between vertical 
and horizontal trust are both important.  If a farmer trusts agricultural technicians only 
marginally more than his or her neighbors then paying the extra transaction costs to seek 
out an agricultural technician may not be worth the extra confidence in the knowledge 
source.  However, if he or she trusts agricultural technicians much more than his or her 
neighbors then the extra confidence in the knowledge source may be worth the extra 
transaction costs of seeking out an agricultural technician. 
The knowledge regression results show that farmers with more horizontal trust 
have more bad information about pesticides.  Farmers with more vertical trust than 
horizontal trust tend to have more good information about pesticides.  One way to 
interpret this is that vertical trust may facilitate interactions between farmers and   14
agricultural professionals who share ‘good’ knowledge.  Farmers may operationalize 
their vertical trust to attend formal training workshops provided by agricultural 
technicians.  Also, farmers may operationalize their vertical trust in informal settings by 
systematically deferring to individuals with more agricultural training. We expect the 
returns to vertical trust to be highest when farmers have had more viable options to invest 
their vertical trust in professionals.  For example, vertical trust may facilitate exchange 
more effectively when opportunities, such as training workshops, are available compared 
to when opportunities to interact with agricultural technicians are not available.  To 
examine this hypothesis we run two separate knowledge regressions by county. 
Column (3) of table 5 shows that Pesticide is the only statistically significant 
explanatory variable when we run the knowledge regression on the 70 observations from 
Santa Clara.  VTrust is not significant with a p-value of .945, and this is consistent with 
expectations, since there have been no previous training workshops or field days in Santa 
Clara.  In column (4) of table 5 we present the knowledge regression results on 62 
observations from Triunfo we find that both Pesticide and VTrust are statistically 
significant.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that vertical trust is correlated with 
knowledge among farmers who have had viable opportunities to interact with agricultural 
technicians. 
In columns (3) and (4) of table 6 we replace HTrust and VTrust with Diff to 
investigate whether more vertical trust than horizontal trust (preference for vertical trust) 
is associated with higher knowledge scores.  In column (3) we find that Pesticide is the 
only statistically significant explanatory variable when we run the knowledge regression   15
on the 70 observations from Santa Clara.  Again, we are not surprised to find that Diff is 
not significant (p-value of .667) since Santa Clara has not had training workshops or field 
days.  However, in the regression on the 62 observations from Triunfo there is a weak 
positive association between Knowledge and Diff (p-value .104).  These results, along 
with the result that VTrust exhibits a significant positive association with knowledge, 
suggest that vertical trust is more positively associated with farmer knowledge when 
farmers have opportunities to interact with agricultural technicians. 
The results in columns 5 and 6 in tables 5 and 6 provide insight into the question 
of causality.  We present results of separate regressions on knowledge according to 
seminar group.  If trust causes a farmer to seek knowledge then we might expect vertical 
trust to be correlated with knowledge among the farmers who attended the seminar before 
taking the knowledge exam; we expect vertical trust to have less correlation with 
knowledge among farmers who took the knowledge exam before attending the seminar.  
These assertions are based on the fact that farmers can invest their vertical trust only 
when they have opportunities to do so.  Farmers with a preference for vertical trust may 
have been more attentive during the seminar, while those with a preference for horizontal 
trust may have been less attentive.  Therefore, among those who attended the seminar 
first, we expect participants with stronger preferences for vertical trust to score higher 
than their seminar-cohort on the knowledge exam.  For those who took the knowledge 
exam before attending the seminar we expect to see less correlation and statistical 
significance between levels of trust and knowledge scores because farmers would not   16
have had the same opportunity to invest their vertical trust in agricultural technicians 
during the seminar. 
Results show that among those who attended the seminar and then took the 
knowledge exam there was a statistically significant correlation between trust levels and 
knowledge scores.  Among these farmers, those with more vertical trust than horizontal 
trust scored higher on the knowledge exam.  These findings support our hypothesis that 
those farmers with more vertical trust than horizontal trust acquired more information 
from the seminar.  If we are controlling for the relevant determinants of knowledge then 
these results suggests that farmers with more vertical trust than horizontal trust paid more 
attention during the seminar.  This provides some evidence that causality can function 
from trust levels to higher levels of knowledge.  In particular, these results provide some 




This paper provides insight in to the role of trust in social exchange.  Many studies have 
focused on how trust can lubricate social exchange and lead to more desirable social and 
economic outcomes.  Trust may facilitate social exchange; however, desirable social and 
economic outcomes do not necessarily result.  We present evidence that in some cases 
outcomes are associated with the type of trust, not just its level.  We obtain information 
about the relationship between experimental measures of trust and pesticide knowledge.  
Results are consistent with the hypotheses that farmers with more horizontal trust or   17
stronger preferences for horizontal trust tend toward social interactions with individuals 
who are less knowledgeable; farmers with more vertical trust or stronger preferences for 
vertical trust tend toward interactions with individuals who are more knowledgeable. 
We find trust measures to be correlated with pesticide knowledge.  There is a 
significant negative correlation between knowledge and horizontal trust, but a significant 
positive correlation between knowledge and farmers who exhibit a preference for vertical 
trust.  Future studies may better capture the cause and effect between trust levels and 
outcomes such as knowledge in a variety of ways.  Ideally, researchers could collect a 
panel of data that measures knowledge and trust levels before and after an intervention 
program with professionals.  Such a study could also include detailed questions about the 
history of interactions with community farmers and agricultural technicians to help 
understand the direction of causality. 
Too often, social capital refers to clubs or groups embedded in horizontal trust 
relationships.  In this study, we distinguish between trust in horizontal and vertical 
relationships; we find associations between our trust measures and pesticide knowledge 
that suggest farmers may be better off by entering into more vertical trust relationships 
and fewer horizontal trust relationships.  However, these associations also suggest that 
once “good” information is inserted into the social network, it may spread substantially.  
Our study reminds policy makers that social capital does not always function in a way 
that leads to socially desirable outcomes. 
With respect to the trust measures, the regression on difference in trust suggests 
that women, compared to men, trust agricultural technicians more than their community   18
farmers, despite that the regressions on horizontal and vertical trust show that women do 
not trust differently than men.  If female preference for vertical trust generalizes to rural 
households in developing countries then extension-based training programs may be more 
effective when female participation is encouraged.  This lends credence and supplements 
the importance development literature has placed on the role of women in development 
(Sen 1999).  Increasing the agency of women may be valuable to households, in part, 
because increased agency expands women’s capacity to operationalize their vertical trust 
by investing in professional ties. 
Finally, in Ecuador and other developing countries, plants pests and diseases still 
damage crops and produce large economic losses for farmers.  The improper use of 
pesticides cause substantial health costs for agricultural workers.  Integrated Pest 
Management technology and pesticide safety equipment can help ameliorate negative 
outcomes, but technology transfer is often not a rapid process.  Diffusion of a technology 
can be slowed when farmers face asymmetric information and high search costs.  This 
study finds that trust in agricultural technicians is associated with higher levels of 
knowledge; therefore, trust in agricultural technicians may facilitate the diffusion of 
knowledge and technology. 
These conclusions should be considered in light of limitations due to using field 
experiments as part of the research methods.  First, our sample of farmers suffers from 
self-selection bias.  The design of the field experiment necessitated that farmers convene 
in one location to participate in the experiments and seminar.  We could not force farmers 
to attend; farmers who do not trust professionals are likely to stay at home.  The other   19
main limitation of field experiments is that we do not have a laboratory setting; therefore, 
it difficult to perform the experiment identically for each group.  While we tried to use 
the same directions and examples for each group, deviations occurred and may have 
affected the results.  Despite these limitations, field experiments offer a crucial 
advantage: we can observe behaviors instead of asking hypothetical questions about 
behavior. 
In summary, it is impressive that experimental measures of behavioral norms 
were associated with pesticide knowledge, while other common human and physical 
capital variables showed little or no association with pesticide knowledge.  Future 
experimental studies may provide more clarity to our results, and how trust can function 




1 Social scientists often consider the amount returned by the receptor as a measure of 
trustworthiness or willingness to reciprocate.  In this study we consider the percentage 
returned by the trustee as a measure of willingness to reciprocate, which we refer to as 
‘reciprocity’. 
2 Please see Appendix A for the Experiment and Workshop Organization. 
3 Like other field experiments (Barr 2003; Karlan 2005; Schechter 2006), our 
experiments were not run double-blind in order to make sure that farmers understood the 
game.   20
 
4 The knowledge exam was comprised of 12 basic questions about the two most common 
pesticides in the Upper Amazon Basin of Ecuador, Monitor and Furadan. 
5 We also ran four OLS regressions on knowledge using interaction terms with County.  
In one regression on knowledge we included the interaction terms, County*HTrust and 
County*VTrust; in the second regression we let all of the right hand side variables vary 
across County.  In the second two regressions we replaced HTrust and VTrust with the 
variable Diff.  We find no explanatory power in these regressions and do not present the 
results. 
6 We also ran four OLS regressions on knowledge using interaction terms with Seminar.  
In one regression on knowledge we included the interaction terms, Seminar*HTrust and 
Seminar*VTrust; in the second regression we let all of the right hand side variables vary 
across Seminar.  In the second two regressions we replaced HTrust and VTrust with the 
variable Diff.  While we do not present the results, we find that farmers who attended the 
seminar first and who preferred vertical trust over horizontal trust exhibited higher 
knowledge scores. 
7 In the Paraguay study participants played the risk game and both roles in the trust game.  
In the our study participants played the risk game and both roles in the trust game with 
community members; participants only played the sender role in the trust game with 
agricultural technicians.   21
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Appendix A  Experiment and Workshop Organization 
Local agricultural technicians and officials individually notified households of the 
workshop via flyers approximately one week in advance of the workshop.  The flyers 
stated that participants would receive a seminar on naranjilla farming, a small lunch and a 
small farming gear item (mask, gloves, ponchos or goggles).  There was no mention of 
winning money since the local agricultural technicians were worried that advertisements 
claiming to give money away might appear to be politically motivated.  We selected the 
sites in order to obtain about 15-30 participants at each location. 
On the day of a field experiment farmers arrived around nine in the morning.  
Shortly thereafter we explained to the farmers why we were there and what we wanted to 
achieve during the day.  The farmers understood that the activities were also part of a 
research project that I was conducting and that they were not obligated to participate.  
Then we divided the participants into two groups of equal size (I will refer to these as the 
seminar group and experiment group).  The seminar group went to attend a seminar on 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) techniques for naranjilla while the experiment group 
stayed with the research assistants, enumerators and me to complete the surveys and the 
experiments.  Both the seminar and the surveys along with the four experiments took 
about three and half hours to complete.  After the morning session was completed the 
participants ate lunch, although the two groups ate separately and were not allowed to 
interact.  After lunch the groups switched; we finished the day between four and five in 
the afternoon.   25
The survey and experiments were completed in a community pavilion or hall.  
After the experiment group was seated and comfortable we provided a short introduction 
and explained that the farmers could earn real money from each of the activities in which 
they were going to partake.  We told them that they would participate in the activities 
using fake money but in the end they would turn in the fake money for real money.  We 
explained they would receive an average of their earnings—altogether they would earn an 
average of eight to ten dollars (about two and half days wages); some participants would 
earn more, other less. 
We began by presenting the first two activities:  the trust game between farmers 
and the trust game between farmers and agricultural technicians.  The moderator, an 
Ecuadorian, provided a general explanation of the game and gave two brief verbal 
examples.  Then he moderated a more elaborate example between my U.S. research 
assistant, an enumerator and myself.  In the example, each of us came up one at a time 
and sat down in front of the moderator and he asked us questions as he would during the 
real experiment.  We each went up individually a second time to play as the receptor in 
the trust game.  We recorded our allocation decisions on a large chart to demonstrate to 
the farmers how they would distribute the money in their envelopes.  After recording our 
distribution decisions the moderator gave us an envelope; we opened the envelopes and 
distributed the money according to what we had written on the chart.  After we finished 
going up the second time all three of us returned to the front of the room and we each 
received our original envelopes; then the moderator summed up how much each person 
had received in total.   26
Following this example we told them that when they came up the first time they 
would also participate in an identical activity involving an agricultural technician.  The 
only difference in this second activity was that they would be sending the money to an 
agricultural technician instead of another farmer.  We made it clear to the farmers that 
they would only send an envelope to an agricultural technician and that they would not 
receive an envelope from an agricultural technician. 
When we completed the explanations we asked some of the farmers to begin their 
interviews while the rest of the farmers formed a semi-circle facing away from the 
moderator’s table.  I occupied the farmers while they went up to the moderator’s table; 
there was also food and drink set out for the farmers.  I directed the farmers to go up one 
at a time to the moderator’s table and made sure the group did not discuss the 
experiments. 
When the farmers went up to the moderator’s table they played as a sender in the 
trust game with another farmer; then they played as the sender in the trust game with an 
agricultural technician.  Finally, they played as the receptor in the trust game with another 
farmer.  They filled out their form that pre-committed them to returning a certain amount 
of money to the original owner of the envelope according to the amount sent.  Afterwards 
the moderator explained he would keep this distribution form and that they would not 
receive an envelope from another farmer until everyone had completed the first cycle. 
When everyone had passed the moderator’s table a first time we called everyone 
in the experiment group back together and explained the risk game.  The moderator 
provided a general explanation of the risk game using a chart.  Next he moderated a more   27
elaborate example between himself, an enumerator and myself.  Each of us put part of 
our money down on the ground as our bets and then the moderator rolled the die and 
distributed our winnings accordingly.  Then he rolled the die a second time considering 
different bets and distributed the money accordingly.  Then without rolling the die he 
went through how much each of us would win considering some of the remaining 
options.   
After the explanations were complete for the second cycle we asked those farmers 
who had not completed their interviews to start their interviews while the rest of the 
farmers formed a semi-circle facing away from the moderator’s table.  Just as after the 
first set of instructions I occupied the farmers while they went up to the moderator’s table 
and directed the farmers to go up one at a time to the moderator’s table.  Likewise, I 
made sure the group did not discuss the experiments. 
When the farmers went up to the moderator’s table they played the risk game.  
Next, they received an envelope from an anonymous farmer and distributed the money 
therein according to their pre-committed distribution forms.  After everyone had finished 
coming up the second time the farmers came up a third time to receive their winnings.  
They received their original envelope with whatever money had been returned by the 
farmer who had received it.  They also received their original envelope used in the trust 
game with an agricultural technician; inside remained whatever money had been returned 
by the agricultural technician who had received it.  Next all the money they had 
accumulated was counted and they received the average of their winnings. 
END OF EXPERIMENT AND WORKSHOP ORGANIZATION   28
Appendix B  Tables 1-9 
Table 1. Description of Variables           
VARIABLE Description 
Male  1=Male; 0=Female 
Age  Age in years divided by 100. 
Basic Education  1=Graduated 6th grade, but not secondary school.; 0=Did not graduate 6th grade or did graduate 
secondary school. 
Advanced Education  1=Graduated secondary school; 0=Did not graduate secondary school. 
Household  Number of members in the household. 
Wealth  Sum of dummy variables for running water, electricity, gas, refrigerator, stove/oven; takes on values 
between 0 and 5. 
Medium Farm  1=20-60 hectares; 0=Less than 20 hectares or more than 60 hectares 
Large Farm  1=More than 60 hectares; 0=Less than 60 hectares 
County  1=Triunfo; 0=Santa Clara  
Seminar  1=Attended the seminar first; 0=Attended the experiment first 
Argue  1=In the experiment group that argued with me; 0=Not in the group that argued with me 
Bet  Amount out of five dollars bet in the risk game; may take on integer values from 0 to 5. 
Reciprocity 
Computed by adding the shares a farmer reported they would return to an anonymous farmer if they 
received 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15 dollars in an envelope.  This sum is then divided by 45=(3+6+9+12+15); then 
we multiply by 5 to compute level of reciprocity on a five point scale.  
Pesticide  1=Adopted pesticide use more than five years ago; 0=Otherwise. 
HTrust  Amount out of five dollars sent in the trust game to an anonymous farmer; may take on integer values 
from 0 to 5. 
VTrust  Amount out of five dollars sent in the trust game to an anonymous agricultural technician; may take on 
integer values from  0 to 5. 
Diff  VTrust minus HTrust; may take on integer values from -5 to 5. 
Knowledge 
Farmers were asked twelve basic questions about the two most common pesticides (Monitor and 
Furadan).  We asked simple questions such as, "Does this kill the fruit worm?" and "Does this kill 
fungus?".  The knowledge scores are reported as percentages and so may take on values from 0 to 100. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics          
VARIABLE Mean/%  Min  Max 
Age  38.88 14  80 
Education (years)  6.67 0  15 
Wealth  2.54 0  5 
Male  72.2%    
Basic Education  61.6%    
Advanced Education  17.2%    
Medium Farm  62.1%    
Large Farm  8.0%    
Santa Clara Canton  62.3%    
First Seminar Group  58.9%    
Argument Occurred  9.7%    
Pesticide
a  38.0%    
Bet  2.3 0  5 
Sent in Trust Game w/ Farmer  2.20 0  5 
Sent in Trust Game w/ Ag. Tech.  2.29 0  5 
Share returned by Trustee  37.9% 0% 89.0% 
Knowledge Score
b  55.0% 0.0%  100.0% 
No. of Obs.  191    
a No. of Obs. 162, 
b No. of Obs. 145          
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Investment Games 
  Paraguay
a  Ecuador 
Number of Players  188 191 
Initial Endowment Size (US$)  $1.67 $1.25 
Mean Investment in Farmer
b 0.46  0.44 
Mean Investment in Ag. Technician   0.46 
Mean Response of tripled investment  0.43 0.38 
Mean Bet  0.43 0.46 
aResults from Schechter 2006.  
bResults are shown as a proportion of the initial endowment 
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Table 4. Trust Regressions
a       
  Horizontal Trust  Vertical Trust Diff  (VTrust-HTrust) 
VARIABLE  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male  0.480** 0.332  -0.317  -0.429 -0.797**  -0.760** 
  0.031  0.145 0.232 0.101 0.010 0.016 
Age  0.235 -0.077  1.575*  1.254  1.340  1.330 
  0.768  0.926 0.053 0.135 0.183 0.185 
Basic Edu.  0.242  0.238 0.033 0.001 -0.209  -0.237 
  0.451  0.433 0.920 0.998 0.624 0.575 
Advanced Edu.  -0.089  0.058 -0.152 -0.046 -0.063 -0.104 
  0.833  0.885 0.714 0.910 0.907 0.847 
Household  0.013 0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 
  0.692  0.871 0.855 0.709 0.666 0.686 
Wealth  -0.050  -0.052 -0.013 -0.009 0.037  0.043 
  0.412  0.395 0.841 0.893 0.629 0.573 
Medium Farm  0.358 0.407*  -0.173  -0.150 -0.531* -0.557* 
  0.124  0.078 0.511 0.561 0.084 0.067 
Large Farm  0.639* 0.689*  -0.614  -0.525 -1.253**  -1.215** 
  0.076  0.051 0.160 0.257 0.024 0.032 
County  0.170 0.008  0.859***  0.721***  0.688**  0.713** 
  0.412  0.969 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.011 
Seminar  0.224 0.174  0.005  -0.011 -0.219 -0.185 
  0.230  0.341 0.980 0.960 0.407 0.484 
Argue  -0.290  -0.334 0.672* 0.642* 0.963* 0.975* 
  0.469  0.391 0.075 0.080 0.068 0.059 
Bet   0.206***    0.113    -0.093 
    0.004  0.136  0.350 
Reciprocity   0.155   0.305**   0.149 
    0.247  0.046  0.431 
a OLS with robust standard errors, p-values reported beneath coefficients
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% significant; based on 191 observations   31
Table 5. Knowledge Regressions with Horizontal and Vertical Trust
a          
   Knowledge
b  Sta. Clara
c  Triunfo
d  Seminar 1
e  Seminar 2
f 
VARIABLE  1 2  3 4  5  6 
Male  2.786 4.508  3.633  4.15 8.831  2.967 
   0.455 0.259  0.523 0.534  0.114  0.636 
Age  -15.523 -14.596  5.304  -19.131  -22.675  -34.468 
   0.278 0.324  0.836 0.403  0.338  0.132 
Basic Edu.  4.994 4.784  8.888 1.117  11.293 -1.372 
   0.331 0.344  0.33  0.87 0.112  0.868 
Advanced Edu.  6.951 5.836 15.268 -5.38 11.36  0.183 
   0.324 0.424  0.221 0.588 0.39  0.986 
Household  -1.017 -0.702  -0.55  -0.8  0.191  -0.837 
   0.121 0.305  0.532 0.469  0.855  0.379 
Wealth  -0.346 -0.367  -1.312 2.022 0.845  -1.106 
   0.739 0.721  0.414 0.276  0.579  0.488 
Medium Farm  4.782 5.075  0.268  9.252*  10.950**  -1.227 
   0.163 0.156  0.962  0.09 0.042  0.813 
Large Farm  -12.723 -10.082  -11.451 -13.321 -9.916  -3.626 
   0.137 0.204  0.299 0.185  0.475  0.625 
County  6.810* 6.625       7.267 5.486 
   0.099 0.116       0.202 0.52 
Seminar  5.096 5.868*  4.715  7.609       
   0.124 0.082  0.409 0.139       
Pesticide  11.010*** 12.654***  12.818*  9.384**  15.132***  15.404*** 
   0.002 0  0.054  0.039  0.003  0.005 
Bet     -0.976 -2.042  -0.809 0.16  -3.08 
      0.397 0.258  0.664  0.918  0.137 
Reciprocity     -4.846** -1.891 -17.399  -4.148  -0.715 
      0.027 0.297  0.376  0.297  0.856 
HTrust     -2.718** -2.056  -1.342  -5.303**  1.458 
      0.049 0.399  0.573  0.014  0.61 
VTrust     1.484 0.141  2.848*  2.591  0.547 
      0.197 0.945 0.07  0.164  0.726 
a OLS with robust standard errors, p-values reported beneath coefficients; * 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% significant 
b  132 obs., 
c 70 obs., 
d 62 obs., 
e 65 obs., 
f 67 obs.            32
Table 6. Knowledge Regressions with Difference in Vertical and Horizontal Trust
a       
   Knowledge
b  Sta. Clara
c  Triunfo
d  Seminar 1
e  Seminar 2
f 
VARIABLE 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Male  2.786 4.438  4.309  4.767 7.748  2.196 
   0.455 0.269  0.454  0.461 0.154  0.715 
Age  -15.523 -15.032  2.003  -20.976 -20.198  -32.803 
   0.278 0.303  0.934  0.331 0.387  0.155 
Basic Edu.  4.994 4.688  8.933  1.599  10.709 -1.366 
   0.331 0.348  0.322  0.819 0.123  0.869 
Advanced Edu.  6.951 5.539  14.815 -4.586  10.306 0.812 
   0.324 0.446  0.235  0.646 0.441  0.939 
Household  -1.017 -0.695  -0.581  -0.781 0.116  -0.9 
   0.121 0.305  0.503  0.483 0.913  0.351 
Wealth  -0.346 -0.315  -1.361  1.678  1.037  -1.127 
   0.739 0.76  0.397 0.323  0.488 0.474 
Medium Farm  4.782 4.839  0.031 9.299*  10.329*  -0.586 
   0.163 0.174  0.996  0.094 0.063  0.909 
Large Farm  -12.723 -9.905  -10.476 -13.081 -7.805  -2.931 
   0.137 0.213  0.349  0.209 0.588  0.693 
County  6.810* 6.293       7.121 6.488 
   0.099 0.136       0.216 0.431 
Seminar  5.096 5.711*  3.942  7.326      
   0.124 0.088  0.483  0.146      
Pesticide  11.010*** 12.435***  12.320*  9.828**  14.596***  15.450*** 
   0.002 0  0.057  0.028  0.005  0.004 
Bet     -1.144 -2.217  -0.463  -0.043  -2.552 
      0.313 0.215  0.788  0.978  0.143 
Reciprocity     -5.050** -1.931  -1.6  -5.594  -1.109 
      0.021 0.262  0.403  0.158  0.764 
Diff     1.960* 0.861 2.311  3.753**  -0.008 
      0.066 0.667  0.104  0.029  0.996 
a OLS with robust standard errors, p-values reported beneath coefficients; * 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% significant 
b  132 obs., 
c 70 obs., 
d 62 obs., 
e 65 obs., 
f 67 obs.            33
Table 7.  MS Testing for Regressions in Table 4      
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4  Regression 5  Regression 6 
Observations  191  191  191 191 191 191 
R
2  0.084  0.141  0.130 0.165 0.137 0.146 
Skewness Kurtosis Test  0.254  0.323  0.554 0.625 0.378 0.531 
Omitted Variables Test I
a  0.210  0.954  0.434 0.070 0.941 0.899 
Omitted Variables Test II
b  0.322  0.242  0.097 0.454 0.582 0.715 
a Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of predicted y; 
b Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of RHS variables 
 
Table 8.  MS Testing for Regressions in Table 5      
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4  Regression 5  Regression 6 
Observations  132 132  70  62  65  67 
R
2  0.227 0.284  0.259  0.329  0.296  0.400 
Skewness Kurtosis Test  0.464 0.643  0.222  0.809  0.730  0.859 
Omitted Variables Test I
a  0.830 0.412  0.772  0.247  0.754  0.655 
Omitted Variables Test II
b  0.915 0.907  0.744  0.758  0.375  0.293 
a Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of predicted y; 
b Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of RHS variables
 
Table 9.  MS Testing for Regressions in Table 6      
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4  Regression 5  Regression 6 
Observations  132 132  70  62  65  67 
R
2  0.281 0.287  0.251  0.325  0.289  0.385 
Skewness Kurtosis Test  0.618 0.528  0.243  0.764  0.605  0.911 
Omitted Variables Test I
a  0.363 0.292  0.207  0.323  0.800  0.531 
Omitted Variables Test II
b  0.842 0.884  0.844  0.854  0.456  0.118 
a Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of predicted y; 
b Ramsey regression specification using 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th powers of RHS variables
 